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Sale of Goods Law Reform: an Irish 
perspective. 
 
Fidelma White* 
 
The cornerstone of sale of goods law in the common law world is the English Sale of Goods Act 1893.1 
The 1893 Act was not a reforming statute2; instead, it sought to make sales law more accessible via a 
statutory codification of the existing common law.3  Although expressed to be: An Act for codifying 
the law relating to sale of goods, it was by no means a complete code of the law of sale of goods.4  
Nevertheless, the 1893 Act was an impressive feat of draftsmanship and was adopted as a model 
throughout the common law world, not only in the Commonwealth but also in the United States.5  
 
1* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University College Cork.  The author was a member of the Sales Law Review 
Group (2008-11).  All views expressed in this article are personal to the author. This article was subsequently 
published in (2013) 42 The Common Law World Review  pp. 172-199. 
 
1 56 & 57 Vict., cap. 71.  
2 Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, who drafted the legislation leading to the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, drafted the Sale 
of Goods Bill which was presented to Parliament in 1889.  The Bill lapsed and was re-introduced in 1891.  
Following extensive amendments, the Bill emerged as the Sale of Goods Act 1893.  Although the Bill was 
intended not to alter the common law position at the time, it proved unsuccessful in this regard, in certain 
instances, due to details of drafting and parliamentary amendment. The 1893 Act came into operation on 
January 1, 1894: 1893 Act, s.63.  See further M. Bridge, ‘The evolution of modern sales law’, [1991] LMCLQ 52; 
R. Goode, Commercial Law, 4th edn (LexisNexis: London, 2009) Ch 6; and the Introduction to the First Edition of 
Chalmer’s Sale of Goods Act 1893 18th edn (Butterworths: London, 1981). 
3  Other areas of commercial law underwent similar treatment: see e.g. the Bills of Sale Acts 1878-91; the Bills 
of Exchange Act 1882; the Factors Act 1889; the Partnership Act 1890; and the Marine Insurance Act 1906.  All 
this legislation continues in force in England (and indeed in Ireland) today.  See further A. Rodgers, ‘The 
codification of commercial law in Victoria Britain’, (1992) 109 LQR 570. 
4  See 1893 Act, s. 61(2) which states: ‘The rules of the common law, including the law merchant, save in so far 
as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, and in particular the rules relating to the law of 
principal and agent and the effect of fraud, duress or coercion, mistake or other invalidating cause, shall continue 
to apply to contracts for the sale of goods’. See also English Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 
Sale and Supply of Goods, (Law Com. No. 160, Scot. Law Com. No. 104, 1987), para. 1.5 
5 The Sale of Goods Act 1893 was adopted in what has been described as ‘an intermittent and haphazard manner’ 
in the various Canadian provinces: in 1896 in Manitoba, in 1897 in British Columbia, in 1898 in the Northwest 
Territories of Canada (formed into the Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905) and in 1910 in Nova 
Scotia.  Although the 1893 Act was never formally adopted as a Uniform Act in Canada, one of the earliest 
initiatives of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada was to recommend to 
Provinces that had not already done so to adopt the Sale of Goods Act 1893.  Thereafter, the 1893 Act was 
adopted in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island in 1919 and in Ontario in 1920. Regarding Australia, see 
Sale of Goods Act 1895 (S.A.); Sale of Goods Act 1895 (W.A.); Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld.); Sale of Goods Act 
1896, now 1958 (Vic.); Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas.); Sale of Goods Act 1923 (N.S.W.); Sale of Goods Act 1954 
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On enactment in Westminster in 1893, the Sale of Goods Act applied automatically in Ireland.6 With 
Irish Independence in 1922, came the formal separation of the English and Irish legal systems.  
Notwithstanding, the Irish Constitution (1922, and later 1937) provides that pre-1922 statutes 
applicable to Ireland, such as the Sale of Goods Act 1893, continue in force; further, pre-1922 case law 
continues to bind Irish courts.7   
All remained quiet with sale of goods law in Ireland until the 1970s and 1980s.8  Throughout the 
common law world at this time various legislative initiatives were undertaken to modernise the law 
of sale and in particular, to address the position of the consumer buyer.  So, for example, in the UK, 
the 1893 Act was amended by the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 which restricted the 
extent to which sellers could exclude liability for breach of the statutory implied terms and a new 
definition of ‘merchantable quality’ was introduced.9 Other jurisdictions introduced separate 
consumer legislation, amending the law of sale of goods and more.  In South Australia, the Consumer 
Transactions Act 1972 also provided a definition of merchantable quality and regulated the use of 
exclusion clauses in consumer contracts. While in Saskatchewan, the Consumer Products Warranties 
Act 1978 was notable because it provided for further protections (as regards express warranties, 
implied warranties; written warranties and additional remedies) in relation to consumer contracts for 
the sale of goods and its scope extended beyond the immediate seller and buyer of goods.10   
In Ireland, inspired by developments in the UK and Canada11, the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services 
Act 1980 was enacted to modernise the law and protect consumers.12  As well as recasting the implied 
 
(A.C.T.); Sale of Goods Act 1972 (N.T.). Regarding New Zealand, see the Sale of Goods Act 1895, replaced by the 
Sale of Goods Act 1908. Regarding the United States, see the Uniform Sales Act 1906; see now Uniform 
Commercial Code, Art. 2.  
6 See the Union of Ireland Act 1800 and the Act of Union (Ireland) 1800.  This legislation provided for the union 
of Great Britain and Ireland into one kingdom, from 1 January 1801.  The legislation included provision for one 
Parliament, based in Westminster. 
7 See Art. 72 of the 1922 Constitution.  See now Art. 50 of the Constitution, Bunreacht na hÉireann, 1937 which 
provides that ‘Subject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not inconsistent therewith, the 
laws in force in Saorstát Éireann immediately prior to the coming into force of this Constitution shall continue 
to be of full force and effect until the same or any of them shall have been repealed or amended by the 
Oireachtas.’  See further R. Byrne & P. McCutcheon, The Irish Legal System, 5th edn (Bloomsbury: Haywards 
Heath , 2009) paras 2.64–2.65, and para 2.91. 
8 The implied terms from the 1893 Act were adapted to hire-purchase transactions in the Hire-Purchase Act 
1946. 
9 See also Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
10  See now the Consumer Protection Act, SS 1996. 
11 National Prices Commission, Occasional Paper No. 9. Consumer Protection Law in America, Canada and Europe 
(Stationery Office: Dublin, 1973) (known as the Whincup Report); National Consumer Advisory Council, 
Submission to the Minister for Industry and Commerce on Proposals for Legislation to Assure the Consumers’ 
Interests (Stationery Office: Dublin, 1974). 
12 Other consumer legislation enacted in Ireland around this time included the Consumer Information Act 1978; 
the Trading Stamps Act 1980 and the Pyramid Selling Act 1980. 
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terms and regulating their exclusion, Part II of the 1980 included new implied terms in relation to spare 
parts and servicing, and motor vehicles; it introduced a right to request cure for consumer buyers; and 
it regulated manufacturers’ guarantees.  However, the 1893 Act remains the principal Act in Ireland 
today, with Part II of the 1980 Act amending certain provisions of the 1893 Act by substitution and 
introducing some new provisions: together this legislation is referred to as the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 
and 1980.13 Since 2003, a third layer of regulation of certain aspects of consumer sales law has been 
added by the European Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees) Regulations, 2003.14  These Regulations were made to transpose a European Directive of 
the same name15 and are additional to the rules contained in the Sale of Goods Acts.   
Deficiencies in this legislative framework are numerous and widely recognised.16 For instance, 
although it has been amended (in 1980) and supplemented (in 2003), the 1893 Act still dominates. 
Accordingly, many of the provisions are out-moded, even archaic, and thus, are not suited to our 
modern economy and consumer society. A clear example of this type of deficiency is the core 
requirement under the legislation that where goods are sold in the course of a business they must be 
of ‘merchantable quality’.17 Despite the introduction of a statutory definition in 1980, this phrase, 
‘merchantable quality’, is rooted in the nineteenth century, and is not a phrase in common usage 
today. Hence, there is a lack of common comprehension of this phrase, both in a commercial and a 
consumer context.  
Another major criticism relates to the over-complicated nature of the legislative framework from a 
consumer perspective. The Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1980 apply to both commercial and consumer 
sales (although certain provisions only apply where the seller is acting in the course of a business – 
e.g. section 14(2) of the 1893 Act on merchantable quality; while others only apply where the buyer 
is dealing as a consumer—e.g. section 14 of the 1980 on the joint liability of finance houses). Further, 
the European Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees) Regulations 2003 add another layer of regulation of consumer sales regarding certain 
matters, namely: quality of goods; buyer’s remedies; and guarantees. On the one hand, this legislation 
offers consumers harmonised minimum rights and remedies throughout the European Union, where 
goods do not conform to the contract but, on the other hand, it brings with it an unwanted level of 
 
13 1980 Act, s.9. 
14 S.I. No. 11 of 2003. 
15 Directive 1999/44/EC, [1999] O.J. L171/12. 
16 See further e.g. F. White, Commercial Law, 2nd edn (Round Hall: ublin, 2011), Ch 8; Sales Law Review Group, 
Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Prn. A11/1576, 2011) Ch 1. 
17 See further below. 
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complexity and uncertainty to Irish consumer sales law.18 In transposing Directive 1999/44 into Irish 
law, it was decided not to integrate the new European rules into the pre-existing sale of goods 
framework,19 but instead to enact free-standing Regulations which operate in addition to the Sale of 
Goods Acts.20 Time seems to have been a factor in this decision—the Directive should have been 
transposed by January 1, 200221—though integration would not have been an easy task given the 
differences between Irish sales law and the Directive on a number of key issues. However, the decision 
to transpose the Directive as a free-standing piece of legislation has brought its own difficulties. In 
particular, pursuant to the 2003 Regulations, a consumer buyer of defective goods must elect whether 
to pursue his rights and remedies under the provisions of the Sale of Goods Acts, or the 2003 
Regulations.22 Given the differences between these two regimes—in terms of application of the rules, 
the quality standard, and more significantly, the remedies regime—a lawyer, let alone a consumer, 
would be hard pressed to decide which would be the better course of action to pursue: the provisions 
of the Sale of Goods Acts or the 2003 Regulations.  
These and other deficiencies were recognised by Government when, in late 2008, it established an 
expert group, the Sales Law Review Group, to advise on reform of the law of sale of goods and related 
transactions. The Group’s remit included: 
• To review the general sales law provisions of the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1980 and to 
make recommendations for a scheme of legislation capable of providing a statutory sales law 
framework appropriate to modern-day conditions and needs. 
 
In late 2011, the Sales Law Review Group, issued its final report, Report on the Legislation Governing 
the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services, comprising over 120 recommendations for reform of the law 
 
18 See T. Bird, ‘Directive 99/44/EC on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees: 
its impact on existing Irish sale of goods law’, (2000) European Review of Private Law 279; A. Walley, ‘The 
Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees – Implications for Irish 
Consumer Sales Law’, (2000) Irish Law Times 32; F. White, ‘The EC Directive on Certain Aspects of Consumer Sale 
and Associated Guarantees: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?’ (2000) 7 Commercial Law Practitioner 3. 
19 As was done in the UK: see the UK Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002 (SI 2002, No. 
3045); see further C. Willett et al, ‘The Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations’, [2004] Journal of 
Business Law 94. 
20 Reg. 3(1). 
21 Art. 11. 
22 Reg. 3. 
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of sale of goods and related transactions.23  The Report has been accepted in principle by 
Government,24 but draft legislation is still awaited.25 
This article seeks to examine these recommendations for reform, many of which have been inspired 
by legislative developments or proposals for reform from abroad.  The article will critically review the 
key proposals under a number of contrasting headings. Hence, in the first section, a number of 
recommendations which are long overdue are set beside aspects of the law of sale where it was 
decided to maintain the status quo.  In the next section, a number of key recommendations for reform 
that can be described as ‘predictable’ are contrasted with a variety of recommendations that can be 
described as ‘unpredictable’ or ‘novel’.  And, in the final section, recommendations that arguably ‘go 
too far’ are compared with other recommendations which ‘don’t go far enough’.  This proposed 
methodology has its limitations.  For one, the contrasting headings are not always mutually exclusive 
– some reforms may be long overdue and predictable, or, long overdue and novel; nor are they 
designed to be all encompassing.  Another potential weakness in this methodology is that the different 
headings are by no means evenly balanced, with some headings being scarcely populated while others 
are over-run with examples and illustrations.  Despite these and other limitations, the contrasting 
headings do highlight the complex nature of law reform and provide a useful template within which 
to view the key recommendations, in light of experience from other common law jurisdictions. 
Reforms that are long overdue v. Maintaining the status quo 
Arguably, any area of law where the principal statute dates from 1893 is over-due comprehensive 
review and reform by the twenty-first century.  That said, a couple of aspects of the 1893 Act pre-date 
its enactment by centuries and hence are long overdue reform.   
One of these relics is the market overt exception to the nemo dat rule, found in section 22 of the 1893 
Act.  The nemo dat rule is short-hand for a basic principle of property law that no one can transfer a 
better title than he himself has: nemo dat quod non habet.26 In relation to goods, the basic rule is 
restated in section 21 of the 1893 Act:  
 
23 Prn. A11/1576: available at www.djei.ie/commerce/consumer/slrg.htm.   
24 See Press Release: Bruton Announces Major Overhaul of Consumer Law, 18 October 2011, available at 
http://www.djei.ie/press/2011/20111018.htm. 
25 Around the same time, the European Commission proposed an optional Common European Sales Law in the 
form of a Regulation: COM (2011) 636 final.  If adopted, the Regulation will not replace national contract law 
but will offer consumers and businesses an optional (28th  system) of European sales law.  At the time of writing 
this Regulation was still under negotiation before the Justice and Home Affairs Council. See further Twigg-
Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law, 2nd edn (Routledge- Cavandish: London, 2013). 
26 E.g. Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App. Cas. 459. This, or a similar basic rule, applies to sales of goods, land, and to 
other forms of property, to gifts, and to bailments. 
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Subject to the provisions of this Act, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner 
thereof, … the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had … 
Hence, in a conflict of title between the original owner of goods and an innocent third party purchaser, 
the nemo dat rule favours the original owner.  Over time, a number of common law exceptions to the 
basic rule were developed in order to protect bona fide purchasers and thus encourage commercial 
activity by reinforcing the security of sale transactions. These and other  exceptions are now set out 
in the Sale of Goods Act 1893,27 including section 22(1) on market overt which provides: 
Where goods are sold in market overt, according to the usage of the market, the buyer acquires 
a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of any defect 
or want of title on the part of the seller. 
This exception is said to derive from the ancient lex mercatoria,28 and has been part of the common 
law since the fifteenth century, a time when the only trading in goods occurred in open markets and 
neither people nor goods were very mobile. It sought to represent a compromise between the 
interests of the owners of goods and the traders and buyers at such markets. Where goods were 
stolen, the onus was placed on the owner to go to the nearest market to seek his goods. If an owner 
failed in this endeavour and the goods were sold at market, the buyer took a good title, hence 
encouraging trading at markets. Clearly, today, the same rationale does not hold good.29  
 
There are a number of options in terms of reform.  For example, in 1966 in the UK, the Law Reform 
Committee suggested extending the principle to all sales from retail premises thereby further 
protecting innocent purchasers of goods and facilitating commercial transactions generally.30 This 
approach was taken in Hong Kong in 2000 when the market overt exception was extended to goods 
sold openly in a shop or market.31  However, most other jurisdictions have taken a very different 
approach to reform.  For example, in England, following strong lobbying by fine art dealers and 
others32, the market overt exception was repealed by the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994.33 
Others have also abolished the market overt exception over the years including, various Canadian 
 
27 1893 Act, ss.21-26; see also ss. 2, 8 and 9 of the Factors Act 1889. 
28 Scrutton J. in Clayton   Le Roy [1911] 2 Q.B. 1031 at 1038–9. 
29  See further L.B.C. Gower, ‘Sale of Goods in Market Overt’ (1949) 12 MLR 371; E.R.H. Ivamy, ‘Revision of the 
Sale of Goods Act’, (1956) 9 CLP 113; P.M. Smith, ‘Valediction to Market Overt’, 41 (1997) American Journal of 
Legal History 225. 
30 See the Twelfth Report of the Law Reform Committee, Transfer of Title to Chattels, Cmnd. 2958 (1966); see 
further A.L. Diamond, ‘Law Reform Committee: Twelfth Report,’ (1966) 29 MLR 431; P.S. Atiyah, ‘Law Reform 
Committee: Twelfth Report,’ (1966) 29 MLR 541. 
31 Sale of Goods Ordinance, Cap.26, s.24, amended 66 of 2000, s.3. 
32 See, e.g. The Times, July 25, 1994, p.5 where the equivalent of section 22 was referred to as a ‘thief’s charter’ 
because of the view that the market overt exception facilitated the ‘laundering’ of stolen goods. 
33 See also D.T.I. Consultation Document, Transfer of Title: Sections 21 to 26 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (1994).  
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provinces, Singapore, New Zealand and a number of Australian states. 34  In fact, in Hong Kong, the 
Law Reform Commission has since recommended repeal of the market overt exception.35  Likewise, in 
Ireland, the Sales Law Review Group has also recommended repeal of the market overt exception. The 
Group agreed that criticisms of the market overt exception as archaic and anomalous are well-founded 
and its abolition would mean that, where goods are stolen, title to them could not pass to an innocent 
third party purchaser.36   
A second relic can be found in section 4(1) of the 1893 Act  which provides that a contract for the sale 
of goods of the value of £10 or more is not enforceable by action unless: 
(i)  the buyer accepts, and actually receives, part of the goods sold; or 
(ii)  the buyer gives something in earnest to bind the contract; or 
(iii)  the buyer has made part payment; or 
(iv)  there is a note or memorandum in writing of the contract and signed by the party to be 
charged. 
 
This provision derives from the Statute of Frauds 167737 and a time when executory contracts were 
treated with some suspicion by the law.38 Fears of perjury and fraud on the courts lead to the 
requirement of written evidence for certain contracts if they were to be enforceable. Executory 
contracts no longer suffer from this secondary status when compared with executed contracts, and 
so the distinction maintained by section 4 is unfounded.39 Again there are a couple of options for 
reform.  In the US, for example, the monetary amount has been updated to keep pace with inflation: 
it now stands at $5,000.40  More commonly, section 4 of the 1893 Act has been repealed in many other 
jurisdictions, including in the United Kingdom in 1954,41 and New Zealand in 1956.42 The rationale for 
repeal is quite convincing. The minimum figure of £10 is totally out of date due to inflation. As a result, 
the provision catches a whole range of transactions that was never intended to come within its 
 
34  Interestingly, the market overt rule never applied in Scotland or, it appears, in Wales. 
35 Law Commission Report on Contracts for the Supply of Goods (2002) Recommendation 26. 
36  Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Prn. 
A11/1576, 2011) para 7.40. 
37  Regnal. 29 Cha  2; see also Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695, 7 Will 3 ch.12. 
38 See P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contracts (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1979) Chs 6 and 7 
and at 419–424. 
39 See e.g. Law Revision Committee, Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of Consideration: Sixth Interim Report 
Cmd. 5449 (Stationery Office: London, 1937) para. 9. 
40 See U.C.C. 2–201(1). 
41 Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954, s.1. 
42 Contracts Enforcement Act 1956. In Australia, these formal requirements have been repealed in South 
Australia, Queensland, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, and the Northern Territory, 
though it remains in force in Western Australia and Tasmania. In Canada, the equivalent provision has been 
repealed in British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario, though it remains in force with a threshold 
of $40-50 in a number of other provinces, including Alberta, Newfoundland, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia. The 
equivalent provisions in sale of goods legislation in Hong Kong and Singapore have also been repealed. 
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scope.43 The section has been further criticised for offering an expedient way out of freely entered 
into contractual obligations where changes in market conditions make this advantageous.44 More 
generally, today, when parties enter into contracts (whether executed or executory) they expect to 
be able to enforce the contract. The law should support this expectation and not hinder it by requiring 
out-of-date formalities to be complied with. Accordingly, the Sales Law Review Group has 
recommended the repeal of section 4 of the 1893 Act.45 
 
Including the recommendations for reform mentioned above, the Sales Law Review Group has made 
a total of 124 recommendations in its final report. Of this total, it is notable that some 
recommendations are for ‘no change’, or for maintenance of the status quo.  This approach is best 
explained in light of an earlier study commissioned by the Group into the Evolution of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1893 in other jurisdictions, namely the United Kingdom; Canada; Australia, New Zealand; Hong 
Kong; and Singapore; with a view to learning lessons from abroad in terms of reform of the law.46  The 
study identified two main approaches to reform. The first involved a complete review and codification 
of the law of sale, including a clear move away from the principles and structure of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1893. This occurred in the United States with the Uniform Commercial Code (1952) which deals 
with sale of goods in art.2, and, inspired by the US experience, it was attempted, though 
unsuccessfully, in Canada with its Uniform Sale of Goods Act (1981).47 The second approach is 
described in the study as ‘piecemeal’, involving the amendment of particular provisions of the sale of 
goods legislation in need of reform but maintaining the framework of the 1893 Act. In practice, this is 
the approach taken in all of the six jurisdictions surveyed. The Sales Law Review Group in its Report 
also subscribes to this approach as the best means of reform of the law. Its recommendations are 
based on the maintenance of the general philosophy and structure of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, with 
specific proposals for reform being directed at particular deficiencies in the legislation. On closer 
reading of the Report, the Group has opted for maintenance of the status quo in two different 
 
43 J.F. Stephen & F. Pollock, ‘Section 17 of the Statute of Frauds’ (1885) 1 LQR 1. 
44 M. Ní Shúilleabháin, ‘Formalities of Contracting: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Requirements that Contracts be 
Evidenced in Writing’, (2005) Dublin University Law Journal 113, at 117-119. 
45 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Prn. 
A11/1576, 2011) para. 3.23. Another potential relic is the common law principle caveat emptor restated in 
section 14(1) of the 1893 Act.  Bridge has observed that this subsection ‘is the husk of a general rule, deprived 
of almost all content by the various exceptions’: M. Bridge, ‘The evolution of modern sales law’, (1991) LMCLQ 
52 at 54. This provision has been repealed in Hong Kong and the Sales Law Review Group has also recommended 
its repeal in Ireland at para. 4.50. See also recommendation to repeal rules on stoppage in transit in ss. 44-46, 
subject to any evidence to the contrary being brought forward: para. 10.22. 
46 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Prn. 
A11/1576, 2011) Appendix IV. 
47 A Uniform Sale of Goods Act was adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1981, but it has never 
been implemented in the various Canadian provinces. 
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circumstances.  First, various provisions were identified as having given rise to criticism and/or 
proposals for reform but, on balance, the Group has decided that maintenance of the status quo is 
the preferred option. Second, other provisions were found to continue to work well and have not 
given rise to any difficulties or criticism, and hence they are maintained. 
In the first category, for example, is the recommendation to maintain the distinction between 
conditions and warranties which reflects the origins of the 1893 Act in the common law of the 
nineteenth century.48 It is arguable that the classification of all the statutory implied terms as either 
conditions or warranties leads to a lack of flexibility in the law, in particular when dealing with the 
consequences of breach and the remedies available.  While this approach was conducive to 
commercial certainty, it made it possible for contracts to be terminated for breaches of little or no 
material consequence.  It can be further argued that this inflexibility may lead to a watering-down of 
the seller’s obligations as a means of avoiding the rigid effects of this classification.49  A recognition of 
this general inflexibility and its consequences led to the renaissance of the intermediary or innominate 
terms in the Hong Kong Fir50 case in the UK (approved in Ireland in Irish Telephone Rentals v ICS 
Building Society51).  A subsequent case, Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft (The Hansa Nord)52 
applied the reasoning in HongKong Fir to an express term in a contract of sale. 
 
It has been suggested that the inflexibility of the condition/warranty classification could be addressed 
by amending legislation which would identify some or all of the statutory implied terms as innominate 
in character, thereby leaving discretion to the judiciary to determine the appropriate consequences 
of their breach, on a case by case basis.  This proposal was considered by the Law Reform Commissions 
in England and Scotland, in 1983 and again 1987, for instance, in the context of the statutory implied 
terms as to the quality of the goods supplied.53  Ultimately, while the implied terms as to quality in 
Scotland where reclassified as ‘terms’, in keeping with the general law of Scotland54, the distinction 
between conditions and warranties in relation to implied terms as to quality was maintained in 
 
48 See Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services 
(Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para 4.17. 
49 See e.g. Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft (The Hansa Nord) [1976] QB 44; see further P.S. Atiyah, The 
Sale of Goods, 12th edn (Harlow: Pearson, 2010) at 88. 
50  Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26.   
51 [1991] ILRM 880; see further Laird Bros v Dublin Steampacket (1900) 34 ILTR 9; and Taylor v Smyth [1990] 
ILRM 377.  
52  [1976] QB 44. 
53 Law Commission Working Paper No.85 and Scottish Law Commission Consultative Memorandum No.58; Law 
Commissions, Report on Sale and Supply of Goods, (Law Commission No. 160; Scottish Law Commission No. 104). 
54  Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.15B.  Also, in New Zealand, in its consumer sales legislation, the Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1983, the concept of ‘guarantees’ (a form of innominate term) is used when addressing the 
seller’s obligations in relation to the goods.   
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England.55  In other common law jurisdictions, the principal sale of goods legislation also maintains 
the distinction between conditions and warranties.56  As well as keeping in line with other jurisdictions, 
the Sales Law Review Group has rationalised the maintenance of the status quo on a number of 
grounds.  The Report states that the abolition of the condition/warranty classification in future 
legislation, and its replacement by the category of innominate term would be ill-advised for a number 
of reasons.  First, it would create an undesirable rift between sales law and the wider law of contract. 
Second, it is entirely justified on grounds of both policy and practice that the law should recognise that 
some contract terms are more important than others and should attract more potent remedies. Third, 
classifying all terms as innominate, the remedies for which would depend on the nature and effects 
of a breach, would create commercial uncertainty and, in all likelihood, lead to more litigation. And 
last, the loss of automatic entitlement to the right to reject in consumer cases would considerably 
weaken the position of consumers.57  Therefore, the Group recommended that future legislation 
should retain the distinction between conditions and warranties.58 And hence, this recommendation 
brings with it a certainty in the law, which is valuable for both commercial traders and consumers 
alike. 
 
Another provision which has given rise to questions and criticism but which the Group has 
recommended not to change is section 13 on sales by description.59  Section 13(1), unchanged since 
1893, provides that where goods are sold by description, there is an implied condition that the goods 
correspond with the description.60 This may seem like stating the obvious. It appears odd to state that 
 
55  Instead in England, as regards the implied terms as to quality, a new provision was introduced in relation to 
commercial contracts only, which prohibited rejection and termination where the breach of the implied terms 
was minor (s.15A(1), Sale of Goods Act 1979).  Similar changes were made in relation to section 30 on the 
delivery obligation.  This more modest reform sought to address the potential ‘abusive’ conduct of parties 
without altering a core feature of the legislation, though it is not without its critics: see e.g. J. N. Adams & H. 
MacQueen, ed., Atiyah’s Sale of Goods 12th edn (Pearson: Harlow, 2010) at 498. 
56 See Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services 
(Prn. A11/1576, 2011) Appendix IV. 
57 Ibid. at para. 4.14. 
58 Ibid. at para. 4.17. The Group has also recommended that future legislation should clarify that express 
contractual terms may be innominate in character; and, in line with the current English position, future 
legislation should include a default provision restricting the right of buyers in non-consumer sales to reject goods 
for slight breach of the implied terms as to quality and fitness for purpose and correspondence with description 
and sample: para. 4.17. Similar changes are recommended in relation to section 30 on the delivery obligation: 
para. 8.35. 
59 Ibid. at para. 4.27.  Similarly, section 12 on implied undertakings as to title has given rise to various 
commentary and criticism; but again the Group has decided, on balance, that the provision should remain as is: 
para 7.11.  
60 The Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 inserted two new subsections into section 13: subsection 
(2) was based on a provision first included in the UK Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 with the aim of 
clarifying that s.13 applied to cases where the buyer selected the goods in a self-service scenario.  Subsection 
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it is an implied obligation of the contract to delivery goods matching the description, when such an 
obligation is surely an express obligation of the contract.61 This provision is best explained in its 
historical context,62 and it has been noted that section 13 is ‘[c]onceptually … one of the most 
troublesome provisions of the Act’.63  As the Sales Law Review Report states: ‘[m]ore fundamentally, 
there are questions about the utility of section 13 relative to the express terms of the contract - 
principally, what if anything does it add to these terms?’64  Hence, apart from identifying that the term 
is a condition, it is arguable that section 13 is redundant and should be repealed.65  While the Sales 
Law Review Group expresses some sympathy for this view, it does not  go as far as to recommend 
repeal of section 13; rather it opts for its retention, for a number of stated reasons.  First, compliance 
with description is a feature of the European Directive on consumer sales and so its place in European 
law cannot be denied; second, while judges and academics have been critical of the operation of 
section 13, as interpreted by the court, the Group notes the importance of the law being stated clearly 
and simply for non-lawyers, including businesses and consumers.  And last, although the Uniform Sale 
of Goods Act prepared in Canada in the early 1980s deleted the implied term as to description and 
absorbed it into the provision on express warranties, this proposal has never been implemented and 
so no other jurisdiction under reviewed has repealed section 13.66  In effect, section 13 has been 
reinvented and given fresh relevance for the twenty-first century. 
 
Many other provisions of the legislation have been retained because they have not given rise to issues 
in case law or academic commentary and would appear to be working well.  So for example, section 
14(4) on fitness for particular purpose; section 14(5) on terms implied by usage; and section 14(6) on 
sales by agents all fall into this category.67  Equally, bar section 16 on the passing of property in 
unascertained goods (see further below), the rules on the passing of property in sections 17-18 are to 
 
(3), which is not derived from the 1973 Act, provides that a reference to goods on a label or other descriptive 
matter accompanying goods exposed for sale may constitute or form part of a description. 
61 This point was neatly made by Slade LJ in Harlingdon Leinster v C. Hull Fine Art Ltd., [1991] 1 QB 564 at 584 
when he stated: ‘[i]f the court is to hold that a contract is one ‘for the sale of goods by description’ it must be 
able to impute to the parties a common intention that it shall be a term of the contract that the goods will 
correspond with the description.’ 
62 See further Adams & McQueen, above note 54, at 150-151. 
63 See M. Bridge, ed., Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, 8th edn (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2010) para 11-002. See also 
R. Goode, Commercial Law, 4th edn (LexisNexis: London, 2009) at 308. 
64 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Prn. 
A11/1576, 2011) p.138. 
65 See e.g. Adams & McQueen, above note 54, at 155; Goode, above note 63 at 325; and M. Bridge, ‘Do We Need 
a New Sale of Goods Act?’, in J. Lowry and L. Mistrelis ed., Commercial Law: Perspective and Practice 
(Butterworth LexisNexis: London, 2006), para. 2.10. 
66 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Prn. 
A11/1576, 2011) paras 4.23 – 4.27. 
67 Ibid. at para. 4.49. 
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remain, largely, as is68; the rules on the seller’s lien in sections 41-43 are to remain, as is69; and many 
of the new provisions introduced in the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 (such as section 
12 on spare parts and servicing70, section 13 on motor vehicles71 and section 14 on liability of finance 
houses) are to remain, as is.72  
 
As a result, aspects of the legislation which are well past their sell-by-date are to be removed from 
any future legislation.  Few would argue with the repeal of section 4 on formalities, or, the market 
overt exception, for example.  These provisions have no place in a modern sale of goods statute.  
Indeed, it was unfortunate that these aspects of the legislation survived the Sale of Goods and Supply 
of Services Act 1980.  At the same time, the Sales Law Review Group has identified other features of 
the legislation which appear to be working well and hence are not in need of reform; or even if some 
provisions are not perfect, they are also not suitable for statutory reform and any issues that exist are 
either ‘academic’ or more suitable to be resolved on a case by case basis.  The approach of the Group 
to follow the experience of other jurisdictions whereby the broad framework of the 1893 Act is 
maintained while particular provisions in need of reform are addressed, brings with it the minimal 
level of change and seeks to ensure certainty in the law: a quality prized in commercial73 and consumer 
law. 
 
Reforms that are predictable v. Reforms that are novel 
 
As noted above, the Sales Law Review Group grounded their final report in an earlier comparative 
study of the evolution of the 1893 Act in six common law jurisdictions and hence, many of the 
recommendations are inspired by reforms or reform proposals from elsewhere.  Moreover, of the six 
jurisdictions surveyed74, Ireland has a unique relationship with the UK, and in particular English law.  
In light of Ireland’s unique connections with the UK—geographical, economic, legal and political 
(including our minority position in the European Union as common law jurisdictions) —maintaining 
connections through a similar sale of goods framework is to be expected and encouraged, not least 
 
68 Ibid. at para. 6.33. 
69 Ibid. at para. 10.22. 
70 Ibid. at para. 4.68. However, the Group has recommended that the operation of this section, including the 
reasons for its under-utilisation, should be the subject of consultation with interested parties. 
71 Ibid. at para. 4.73, subject to some refinements. 
72 Ibid. at para. 4.77 and this provision is to extended to cover transactions involving the supply of services. 
73 ‘Predictability’ or certainty is the second of eight principles of commercial law identified by Professor Goode: 
see R. Goode ‘The Codification of Commercial Law’, (1988) 14 Monash Law Review 135 at 148–153. 
74 The United Kingdom; Canada; Australia, New Zealand; Hong Kong; and Singapore. 
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because it provides us with access to a significant pool of case law interpreting the legislation. This is 
vital in an Irish context where relevant modern case law is a scarce commodity.   
Therefore, in the past, when the UK modernised its law of sale of goods with the Supply of Goods 
(Implied Terms) Act 1973, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Sale of Goods Act 1979, Ireland 
followed with the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980.  The 1980 Act was clearly influenced 
by developments in the UK (and elsewhere), though not limited by them.75 And so again, when in the 
1990s the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 was amended three times, in close succession, it is hardly 
surprising that Irish commercial lawyers would sit-up and take note.  And thus, a number of 
recommendations of the Sales Law Review Group can be described as ‘predictable’ in that they follow 
a number of more recent UK reforms. 
Three major recommendations for reform from the Sales Law Review Group fit this ‘predictable’ 
category.76  The repeal of the market overt rule, effected in the UK pursuant to the Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1994 is one of the three, already considered above.  A second example, mentioned 
in passing above, is reform of section 16 of the 1893 Act on the passing of property in unascertained 
goods effected in the UK by the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995.  Bearing in mind that the 
ultimate purpose of the contract for the sale of goods is the transfer of property in the goods from the 
seller to the buyer77, sections 16–19 of the 1893 Act contain a series of detailed and technical rules to 
determine when property passes. The operation of these rules depend on whether the goods sold are 
specific goods, future goods, or unascertained goods. So, for example, where there is an unconditional 
contract for the sale of specific goods (that is goods that are identified and agreed upon at the time 
the contract is made78) in a deliverable state, there is a presumed intention that property passes when 
the contract is made.79 Again, for example, where unascertained goods (goods that are not specific) 
or future goods (goods yet to be manufactured or acquired by the seller80) are sold, there is a 
presumed intention that property will pass when the goods are unconditionally appropriated or 
 
75 The provisions in the 1980 Act on spare parts and after sales service; motor vehicles and guarantees went far 
beyond the UK position at that time; even the Irish definition of merchantable quality with its reference to 
‘durability’ marked a distinction in form between Irish and English law. 
76 A fourth ‘predictable’ recommendation for reform is grounded in the concept of a ‘contract for the transfer 
of goods’ from the UK Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.  Accordingly, the Sales Law Review Group has 
recommended that the implied undertakings as to goods currently contained in separate statutes for different 
types of transaction (sale, hire-purchase, consumer hire, work and materials) or not covered by statutory 
provisions (barter/exchange, commercial hire-purchase and hire agreements) should be consolidated in future 
legislation: Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services 
(Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para. 14.14. 
77 1893 Act, s.1. 
78 1893 Act, s.62.  
79 1893 Act, s.18 r.1. 
80 1893 Act, s.5. 
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irrevocability earmarked to the contract.81 However, under section 16, no property can pass in 
unascertained goods until they are ascertained or identified with the contract.82 So, for example, 
where a buyer purchases 500 tons of wheat out of a bulk cargo abroad a ship which contains 1,000 
tons of wheat, no property in the 500 tons will pass to the buyer until the 500 tons are separated from 
the bulk and hence identifiable as the goods being bought. This rule applies even where the goods 
have been paid for in advance and the source of the goods, i.e. the ship, is identified. This rule applies 
equally to pre-paying consumer buyers of unascertained goods, as where goods are sold by a purely 
generic description, such as, 500 litres of heating oil.  In this case, no property will pass until the 500 
litres are separated from the bulk tank, usually on delivery at the consumer’s home. 
 
That the operation of section 16 can lead to injustice is well recognised.83 First, it is mandatory; it 
cannot be contracted out of. Second, it applies equally to wholly unascertained goods and 
unascertained goods from an identified source (known as quasi-specific goods). In particular, where 
the seller becomes insolvent, a pre-paying buyer of unascertained goods is left as an unsecured 
creditor with limited opportunity to recoup any price paid. It has been noted elsewhere that section 
16 operates contrary to most people’s expectations, including buyers and sellers, commercial and 
consumer.84 It also leads to anomalous results. For example, where one buyer purchases the whole 
bulk under several contracts, the goods will be ascertained but where two or more buyers purchase 
the whole bulk there is no ascertainment.85  
 
In its Report, the Sales Law Review Group identified section 16 as in need of reform and recommended 
that provisions along the lines of those contained in the UK Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995, 
should be introduced in Ireland.86 Accordingly, subject to contrary agreement, where there is: 
(i) a pre-paying buyer; 
(ii) of a specified quantity of goods of the same kind;  
(ii) forming part of an identified bulk;  
 
81 1893 Act, s.18 r.5; see further e.g. Aldridge v Johnson (1857) 7 E & B 885; Healy v Howlett & Sons [1917] 1 KB 
337. 
82 Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606. 
83 See e.g. English Law Commission, Sale of Goods Forming Part of  Bulk (Law Com. No. 215, 1993). 
84 R. Goode, ‘Ownership and Obligations in Commercial Transactions’ (1987) 103 LQR 433 at 447–451. 
85 The Elafi [1982] 1 All ER 208. 
86 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para. 6.26. 
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the buyer would be recognised as having a proprietary interest in the goods in the form of an 
undivided share in the bulk and he would become a tenant in common with the other owners. 
Complicated rules on dealing with the bulk and the consequences of a shortfall in the bulk would be 
part of the proposed new legal framework. Moreover, if the buyer’s portion is ever removed from the 
bulk, it would be ascertained for the purposes of section 16, allowing property to pass to the buyer. 
In making this recommendation, the Group has proposed a change which has been effected in a 
number of other jurisdictions, including Singapore and various Australian states such as New South 
Wales, Southern Australia and Victoria. The Group can be bolstered in its recommendation in that this 
new legal framework would appear to be operating well given the lack of case law to date on the new 
provisions.  
The third major reform which falls within this ‘predictable’ category relates to reform of the statutory 
implied terms, in particular section 14(2) of the 1893 Act, and buyer’s remedies, as inspired by the UK 
Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994. Accordingly, the Sales Law Review Group has recommended that 
the term ‘satisfactory quality’ should replace ‘merchantable quality’ as the statutory standard for the 
purpose of the implied terms as to the quality of goods.87 Moreover, goods should be defined as being 
of ‘satisfactory quality’ if ‘they meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as 
satisfactory taking account of any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other 
relevant circumstances’.88 An indicative list of the following specific aspects of quality should apply 
alongside the general definition in appropriate cases: fitness for all the purposes for which goods of 
the kind in question are commonly supplied; appearance and finish; freedom from minor defects; 
safety; and durability.89  
The report of the Law Commissions which was the basis for the reforms in the United Kingdom had 
stated that the proposed reforms were ‘intended to be useful but not revolutionary’.90 Indeed, case 
law in the UK since 1994 suggests that there is little difference, in substance, between ‘merchantable 
quality’ and ‘satisfactory quality’.91 Hence, while it is arguable that these reform proposals have more 
to do with optics than substance, they are to be welcomed for bringing ‘the very heart of the law of 
sale’92 into the twenty-first century. 
 
87 Ibid. at para.4.43. 
88 Ibid. at para.4.48. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Law Commissions, Sale and Supply of Goods (Law Com. No. 160; Scot Law Com. No. 104, 1987) para.1.11. 
91 See further W.C.H. Ervine, ‘Satisfactory quality: what does it mean?’ [2004] Journal of Business Law 684. 
92 Adams & McQueen, above note 54, at 157. 
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Pursuant to the 1893 Act, a buyer’s remedies for breach of contract by the seller depend on whether 
the term breached is a condition or a warranty. Where a condition is breached (the vast majority of 
statutory implied terms being conditions) the buyer can reject the goods (seeking a refund of any price 
paid), terminate the contract, and sue for damages for any resultant loss.93 In contrast, where a 
warranty is breached the only remedy is damages.94 The buyer’s right to reject, in particular, has 
proved a powerful self-help remedy. However, this right is restricted in two important ways. First, the 
right to reject is lost where the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods. And, a buyer is deemed 
to have accepted the goods in three circumstances: where the buyer (i) intimates acceptance; or (ii) 
acts inconsistently with the seller’s ownership, or (iii) retains the goods for a period of time without 
rejecting them.95 Second, and generally, the right to reject is an all-or-nothing remedy: you must reject 
all the goods supplied; or keep all the goods supplied. There is no general right to reject part of the 
goods.96  
The Sales Law Review Group has made a number of important proposals for reform to the right to 
reject and acceptance, many of which are in line with the current UK position. First, as a means of 
avoiding rejection in bad faith in commercial sales, the Group has recommended that future legislation 
should include a default provision restricting the right of buyers in commercial sales to reject goods 
for slight breach of the implied terms as to quality.97 In a similar vein, the Group has recommended 
that the right of buyers to reject for delivery of a wrong quantity should not apply in commercial 
contracts of sale where the excess or shortfall is so slight that it would be unreasonable to reject the 
whole of the goods.98 As a counter-balance to these modest restrictions to a commercial buyer’s right 
to reject, the Group recommends a wider right to partial rejection (reflecting the reality in commercial 
sales). Accordingly, the Group has recommended that future legislation should give buyers a right of 
partial rejection of goods not in conformity with the contract and which do not form part of a 
commercial unit.99 
In relation to the loss of the right to reject following acceptance, the Group has made a number of 
recommendations, some in line with the current position in the UK, others not, which seek to bring 
 
93 1893 Act, s.11(2). 
94 1893 Act, s.62. 
95 1893 Act, ss.34-35. 
96 A limited right of partial rejection does exist in two specific circumstances: (i) where the contract is severable, 
as with an instalment contract (1893 Act, s.11(3) and s.31); and (ii) where goods of a mixed description are 
supplied: 1893 Act, s.30(3). 
97 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para.4.17. 
98 Ibid. at para.8.35. 
99 Ibid. at para.8.39. 
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clarity to the law. In particular, the Group has recommended that in the case of commercial contracts 
of sale, the buyer would not be deemed to have accepted goods by means of intimation of acceptance 
to the seller unless he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for the purpose of 
ascertaining their conformity with the contract100; while in the case of consumer contracts of sale, 
intimation by acceptance should be excluded from the rules governing acceptance in consumer 
contracts of sale in future legislation.101  Further, the rules governing acceptance by reason of acts 
inconsistent with the seller’s ownership of the goods should be amended in future legislation to 
provide that a buyer would not be deemed to have accepted the goods merely because: 
a) the goods have been delivered to a third party under a sub-sale, gift or other 
disposition; or 
b) the buyer asks for, or agrees to, the repair of the goods.102 
In contrast to the recommendations considered above, a number of other recommendations are less 
predictable, or more novel, in seeking to reform Irish sales law.  For example, currently, the Sale of 
Goods Acts 1893 and 1980 only apply to contracts for the sale of goods, as defined.103  However, today, 
goods are often supplied ‘for free’ or on promotions such as ‘buy one, get one free’ and hence arguably 
outside a contractual context. The exact legal status of such common transactions remains unclear; as 
do the rights and remedies of the ‘buyers/recipients’ of such goods.104 Therefore, the Sales Law Review 
Group has recommended that future legislation should clarify that goods supplied ‘free’, or at a 
reduced price, when bought in conjunction with other goods under promotional campaigns or under 
loyalty schemes are subject to the same implied quality and other terms as goods purchased for a 
price.105  
 
A second novel recommendation of the Sales Law Review Group relates to the regulation of exclusion 
or limitation of liability clauses in sale of goods contracts.  Ireland lacks a general set of statutory rules 
which regulate the use of exemption clauses or other unfair terms.  Instead, the Sale of Goods and 
Supply of Services Act 1980 introduced rules which prohibit the use of clauses in relation to consumers 
which seek to exclude or limited the seller’s liability for breach of the statutory implied terms; any 
 
100 Ibid. at para.9.21. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Ibid. at para.9.28. 
103 1893 Act, s.1. 
104 See e.g. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v Customs & Excise Commissioners [1976] 1 All ER 117; Kuwait Petroleum v 
Customs & Excise Commissioners [2000] All ER (D) 2378. 
105 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para. 14.14. See also New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 which applies to gifts: 
1993 Act, s.2. 
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such clauses in relation to commercial buyers must be fair and reasonable.106 Moreover, the European 
Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 and 2000107 provide further 
regulation of unfair terms (including exclusion and limitation of liability clauses) in consumer contracts 
which are not individually negotiated.108  Accordingly, a term which is unfair is not enforceable against 
a consumer.   
 
The Sales Law Review Group expressed the view that the present situation under which exemption 
clauses in consumer contracts are regulated in different ways under different enactments is manifestly 
unsatisfactory and needs to be addressed.109 The Group has identified the Unfair Terms Regulations 
are the most appropriate vehicle for the regulation of exclusion clauses in consumer sale and related 
contracts. Therefore, the Group has recommended that such clauses should be deemed automatically 
unfair under the Regulations.  As well as dealing with the confusion caused by the co-existence of 
overlapping statutory rules, this approach would enable the National Consumer Agency to take action, 
where appropriate, against contract terms which sought to exclude the implied quality and other 
terms in sale contracts.110 
 
A third novel feature of the Sales Law Review Group’s final report takes us back to buyer’s remedies 
and the right to reject.   As noted above, currently, a buyer can looses the right to reject the goods if 
he is deemed to have accepted the goods.  Section 35 sets-out three grounds of acceptance: (i) 
intimation of acceptance by the buyer; (ii) where the buyer does an act inconsistent with the seller’s 
ownership and (iii) where without good and sufficient reason, the buyer retains the goods without 
intimating to the seller that he has rejected them.111 This last ground has proved particularly 
 
106 1893 Act, s.55, as substituted by 1980 Act, s.22. 
107 S.I. No. 27 of 1995, and S.I. No. 307 of 2000. 
108 This form of regulation does not extend to an assessment of the fairness of the definition of the main subject 
matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price: Reg.4, 1995.   
109 Similarly in the UK, in 2005, the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission recommended a single 
harmonised regime to deal with unfair terms in consumer contracts (Law Com No. 292 and Scot Law Com No 
199, 2005).  See more recently Law Commissions, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract: Advice to the Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills, (March 2013).  
110 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para. 5.16. It is also recommended that clauses exempting the implied statutory terms as 
to goods in sales and related contracts between businesses should be unenforceable unless shown to be fair 
and reasonable. Moreover, the ‘deals as consumer’ test at section 3 of the 1980 Act should be repealed and the 
definition of ‘consumer’ for the purposes of the regulation of exemption and other clauses in future legislation 
should refer to a natural person acting for purposes unrelated to his or her business: Sales Law Review Group, 
Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para. 
5.22.  
111 The first two grounds in section 35 have remained unchanged in substance since 1893; however, the third 
ground was altered in 1980 with the insertion of ‘without good and sufficient reason ...’ instead of ‘when after 
the lapse of a reasonable time...’. 
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problematic in terms of predicting the amount of time a buyer has, or what circumstances must 
pertain, before he loses the right to reject. In one English case, based on a corresponding statutory 
provision, a buyer lost the right to reject a car three weeks after delivery,112 while in another case, a 
Canadian case, a buyer was allowed to use a computer system for 17 months and still to exercise his 
right to reject.113 Modern Irish case law in this issue is non-existent and so again the legal position is 
unclear.  Having considered a number of options for reform, the Sales Law Review Group 
recommended the introduction of a fixed time period for the exercise of the right to reject.  The Group 
has proposed a standard thirty day rejection period, with provision for a shorter or longer period in 
specified circumstances.114 Such a change, it is argued, brings with it greater certainty and strikes a 
reasonable balance between the interests of seller and buyers, alike.115   
Reforms that go too far v. Reforms that don’t go far enough 
 
There would appear to be only one recommendation for reform that arguably goes too far, in the 
sense that the case for reform has not been well made out, in the particular circumstances.  This 
relates to the recommendation considered above to introduce a standard fixed period of thirty days 
for the rejection of defective goods.116  This proposal is initially made in relation to consumer contracts 
and in this regard the proposal has merit.  However, the Report goes on to provide that a thirty day 
rejection period should also apply to commercial sales, as a default rule.  Commercial buyers are a 
very different breed from consumer buyers.  A commercial buyer may have an equality of bargaining 
power with the seller and so accept, as a business risk, that some goods may be defective. This risk 
can be factored into any pre-contractual bargaining. Further, a commercial buyer will be less at risk of 
post-contractual threats by the seller that the buyer should keep the goods, as the continuance of a 
good trading relationship may be in the interests of both parties. At worst, a commercial buyer will be 
better able to pursue litigation, if necessary. None of these factors apply to consumer buyers.  The 
 
112 Bernstein v Pamsons Motors (Golders Green) Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 220. 
113 Public Utilities Commission of City of Waterloo v Burroughs Business Machines (1974) 52 DLR 481. 
114 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para. 9.44. See further similar proposals by English and Scottish Law Commissions, 
Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods (Law Com No. 317, Scot Law Com No. 216, 2009); and UK BIS Consultation 
Paper, Enhancing Consumer Confidence by Clarifying Consumer Law (2012). 
115 Other novel recommendations include: simplifying s.23 on sale under voidable title by abolishing the 
distinction between contracts that are void by reason of mistake of identity and voidable for misrepresentation 
(para. 7.40); harmonising the burden of proof for all of the exceptions to the nemo dat rule (para. 7.40); and 
adopting of a provision linking a seller’s an action for the price to delivery modelled on Section 9.11 of the 
Canadian Uniform Sale of Goods Act (1982) to replace s.49 of the 1893 Act (para. 11.12). 
116 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para. 9.44. 
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default nature of the rule for commercial buyers clearly limits its impact on commercial buyers.  
Moreover, maintaining a common set of rules between commercial and consumer buyer has its 
advantages but questions remain about the appropriateness of this recommendation in a commercial 
context.  The Group was conscious of such questions and accordingly it noted: ‘This recommendation 
should be reviewed, however, if evidence emerges that the proposed rule is unsuited to certain types 
of commercial contract’.117 
 
In contrast to the above, there are a number of areas, three major areas, at least, where it is arguable 
that the Sales Law Review Group did not go far enough in their recommendations for reform.  These 
three areas relate to the application of the legislation to digital content; the regulation of contracts 
for the supply of services; and, the wider issue of direct producer liability.  Each of these areas will be 
considered in turn below. 
As already noted, the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1980 only apply to contracts for the sale of goods.118  
‘Goods’ are defined in section 62 of the 1893 Act as including all chattels personal other than things 
in action and money.   In more modern terminology, this definition would seem to comprise all 
tangible moveable items.119 A great many items clearly come within this definition – e.g. commodities, 
cars and foodstuffs – the picture is less clear in relation to other items though, including electricity 
and digital content.  The Sales Law Review Group has made a number of recommendations concerning 
the definition of goods to modernise it120 and bring clarity to it121, however its recommendations in 
relation to the legal status of digital content are dissappointing and may be viewed as a missed 
opportunity. 
There is no Irish authority on the legal status of digital content as goods or otherwise, but in St Albans 
City and District Council v. International Computers Ltd,122 Sir Ian Gildewell stated obiter in the English 
 
117 Ibid. at para. 9.43. 
118 1893 Act, s.1. 
119 Similarly, the 2003 Consumer Sale Regulations apply to ‘tangible moveable items’: Reg. 2. 
120 The Group recommended that the definition of ‘consumer goods’ in Directive 1999/44/EC on consumer sales 
and associated guarantees as ‘any tangible moveable item’ should be the basis of the general definition of 
‘goods’ in future legislation: para. 2.4. 
121 For example, the Group has recommended that electricity and, unless supplied for sale in a limited volume 
or set quantity, gas and water, should be included in the definition of ‘services’ in future legislation: para. 2.35; 
further the part of the definition of ‘goods’ at section 62(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 which deals with 
matters relating to the demarcation between the sale of goods and the sale of land or interests in land should 
be simplified and updated: para. 2.42. 
122 [1996] 4 All ER 481. In Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd [1995] FSR 616, the court 
avoided classifying a supply of software which was adapted to the customer’s needs because it was common 
ground that the law was the same whether it was a supply of services or a sale of goods. A contract to write a 
new program for a customer is clearly capable of being a contract for the supply of services: see Salvage 
Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654. 
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Court of Appeal that while a disk was clearly goods, a program or software, ‘being instructions or 
commands telling the computer hardware what to do’, of itself was not.123 In the St Albans case, as is 
common, the defective program was not sold or hired, it was simply copied from a disk onto the 
plaintiff’s computer without delivery of the disk. The property in the software remained with the 
supplier, while the plaintiff was licensed to use it.124 In these circumstances, the program was not 
‘goods’ so there were no statutory implied terms as to quality. In the absence of any express terms, 
his Lordship held that there would be a term implied at common law that the program should be 
reasonably fit for its intended purpose.  This case gives rise to a number of problems including that 
the buyer’s rights and remedies will differ depending on the means of delivery of the digital content. 
Arguably, where software, such as computer software, music or games, is sold in tangible form, such 
as on a disk or pre-installed on a personal computer or other device, there seems little difficulty in 
treating the software and the tangible item as one – as goods, and hence the protective framework of 
the sale of goods legislation will automatically apply.  After all, many everyday items such as digital 
televisions, washing machines and cars, operate, at least in part, using software.  The greater difficulty 
arise where software is supplied in intangible form, such as when it is download from the Internet, 
under licence.125  Determining a person’s rights and remedies based on the mode of delivery of digital 
content is completely inappropriate and outmoded in our modern information society.126  Moreover, 
relying on the implication of terms at common law, as occurred in St Albans, is without doubt a poor 
substitute for the statutory sale of goods framework, particularly in the consumer context.  
Therefore, uncertainty surrounding the legal status of computer software persists in Ireland and 
elsewhere and has given rise to a volume of academic literature.127  The issue has been addressed, 
within the context of the sale of goods legislation, in New Zealand in 2003128, and more recently in 
 
123 In a New South Wales case, Toby Construction Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd, [1983] 2 NSWLR 
48, the Supreme Court held that the transfer of property in hardware and software together was a sale of goods, 
but this case failed to address the issue of the supply of software alone, and particularly software adapted to 
specified requirements. 
124 See also London Borough of Southwark v IBM UK Ltd [2011] EWHC 549 (TCC). 
125 Further authority from Australia indicates that software downloaded from the Internet under licence is not 
goods for the purpose of relevant Sale of Goods Act: Gammasonics v Comrad [2010] NSWSC 267. 
126 See further S.Hedley, ‘Quality of Goods, Information, and the Death of Contract’ [2001] Journal of Business 
Law 114 at 119–120. 
127  See e.g. V. Niranjan, ‘A Software Transfer Agreement and its Implications for Contract, Sale of Goods and 
Taxation’, [2009] Journal of Business Law 799; J. Adams, ‘Software and Digital Content’, [2009] Journal of 
Business Law 396; S. Green and D. Saidov, ‘Software as Goods’, [2007] Journal of Business Law 161; S. Hedley, 
‘Quality of Goods, Information, and the Death of Contract’ [2001] Journal of Business Law 114; B.L. Horovitz, 
‘Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte out of the Intangibility Myth’, 
(1985) Boston University Law Review 129. 
128 Sale of Goods Amendment Act 2003, s.3: see further Cox, ‘The definition of goods and services in consumer 
protection Acts: some recent changes’, [2003] New Zealand Law Journal 281.  
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Australia in 2010, where the definition of ‘goods’ was extended to include computer software.129  
While this may be seen by some as an improper extension of the concept of goods beyond its 
traditional meaning of tangible items, it has the advantage of simplicity.130  In an Irish context, the 
Sales Law Review Group has noted that the implication of the above case law: 
leads to the clearly unsatisfactory situation that the law applicable to a certain transaction will 
depend on whether software has been delivered on a physical medium such as a disk or a CD (in 
which case it could be classified as a sale of goods) or whether it has been downloaded online (in 
which case it could be categorised as a supply of services, or as a contract sui generis to which 
the statutory rules do not apply).131 
However, despite recognising the unsatisfactory state of the law, the Sales Law Review Group did not 
recommend amending the definition of goods to include digital content, nor did it recommend that 
digital content should be treated, as goods. Instead, it recommended that a comprehensive 
consultative process on the issues of whether strict liability standards are suitable for software 
contracts and on whether there is a need for a specialised instrument dealing with software 
transactions should be undertaken in advance of any further consideration of legislative regulation in 
this area.132  Clearly, the argument put forward by the software industry that the application of strict 
liability rules would be likely to stifle innovation and growth in the sector was taken seriously by the 
Group.133  This is not surprising given the strategic role the ICT sector plays in the modern Irish 
economy. However, this could be seen as a missed opportunity to address the current unsatisfactory 
state of the law but it does have the advantage of tying in with any future European measure which 
may emanate from the European Union.134 In the meantime, sellers and suppliers of digital content 
continue to ‘benefit’ from this gap in regulation to the detriment of buyers, including consumers.135 
 
Turning to contracts for the supply of services, these contracts were first regulated, in general terms, 
in Ireland in 1980 pursuant to Part IV of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act.  This regulation 
 
129 See the Australian Consumer Law: see further Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Sch. 2, Ch. 1, 
s.2.  
130 See K. Moon, ‘Intangibles as Property and Goods’, (2009) New Zealand Law Journal 228.   
131 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para 2.7. 
132 Ibid. at para 2.29. 
133 See e.g. responses to the European Commission Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/detailed_analysis_en.pdf. 
134 See University of Amsterdam, Study on the Legal Framework for Digital Content Services for Consumers 
(2011), a study commissioned by the European Commission: see further: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consumer-marketing/events/digital_conf_en.htm. 
135 See also R. Bradgate, Consumer Rights in Digital Products: Research Report for the UK Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (September 2010). 
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is minimal, comprising four sections which address mainly the implication of various undertakings as 
to quality,136 and the regulation of exclusion clauses.137  There is no statutory definition of a contract 
for the supply of services; the undertakings implied are innominate in nature138; the quality standard 
required when supplying a service is one of due skill, care and diligence; and exclusion of liability for 
breach of this standard is permissible, even against a consumer, so long as the exclusion is ‘express’, 
‘fair and reasonable’ and ‘specifically brought’ to the attend of the consumer.  In referring to the 
minimal nature of this regulation, the Report of Sales Law Review Group states139: 
... it is revealing nevertheless that the statutory rules governing the sale of goods occupy over 
sixty sections of the 1893 and 1980 Acts compared with four sections for the supply of 
services. Part of the explanation for this divergence lies in the fact that, in the formative era 
of commercial statute law, services were a less important and developed component of 
economic activity than goods. This is no longer the case. Services now account for close to 
two-thirds of gross domestic product in Ireland.140 According to the most recent Household 
Budget Survey, thirty per cent of household income went on services and other expenditure, 
while there was also a substantial services element in some other expenditure categories such 
as transport and housing.141 
In light of the importance of services to the modern economy, the Group set about fleshing out the 
regulation of contracts for the supply of services and pitching the level of regulation at a more 
equivalent status to that of sale of goods regulation.  Accordingly, the Group recommended that:  
• a broad definition of services be introduced;142  
• the implied terms as to quality of services should be re-classified as conditions;143  
• as per the UK Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, future legislation should include an 
implied term that, where the time of performance of a service is not fixed by the contract, it 
should be carried out within a reasonable time; it should also include an implied term that, 
where the price for a service is not fixed by the contract, the recipient of the service should 
pay a reasonable price;144 
• future legislation should include a provision along the lines of section 29 of the New Zealand 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 that a service, and any product resulting from it, will be 
 
136 1980 Act, s.39. 
137 1980 Act, s.40. 
138 Irish Telephone Rentals v Irish Civil Service Building Society Ltd [1991] ILRM 880. 
139 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para. 14.18. 
140 http://www.esri.ie/irish_economy  
141 CSO, Household Budget Survey 2004-05: Final Results, 2007. 
142 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para. 14.21. 
143 Ibid. at para. 14.30. 
144 Ibid. at para. 14.38. 
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reasonably fit for any particular purpose made known to the supplier - this provision should 
apply to both consumer and commercial contracts;145 
• all of the implied terms applying to contracts of sale should apply to goods supplied under a 
contract of service in which the property in the goods is transferred from seller to buyer;146 
and 
• exclusion clauses in commercial contracts for services should be regulated on the same basis 
as exclusion clauses in contracts of sale, namely they are unenforceable unless shown to be 
fair and reasonable; whereas exclusion clauses in consumer contracts for services should be 
automatically unfair in all circumstances under the European Communities (Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 and 2000.147 
In the midst of all this detail – which is welcome – there is however, no statutory framework for 
remedies (as there is in sale of good legislation) and hence a very important aspect of the regulation 
of contracts for the supply of services remains unregulated.  The re-classification of the implied terms 
as conditions makes clear that breach of an implied term will allow the recipient of the service to 
terminate the contract and sue for damages, but beyond that many questions remain unanswered.  
More generally, termination may not be the most appropriate remedy: for instance, you cannot reject 
a service when completed in the same way that you can reject goods after delivery. More particularly, 
do recipients (or suppliers) of services have a right of repair; if not, should recipients (or suppliers) of 
services have a right of repair; and if so, how would such a right interact with any right to terminate 
and/or sue for damages? Similarly, where poor quality service is provided, should the recipient be 
entitled to a reduction in the price, as an alternative to repair?  It is unfortunate that the Sales Law 
Review Group did not take this opportunity to, at least, sketch out the bones of a remedial 
framework.148 
Third, the clear focus of the Report of the Sales Law Review Group has been on contracts of supply – 
whether contracts for the sale of goods or contracts for the supply of services. Only the provisions on 
manufacturers’ guarantees in sections 15 – 19 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 
take us outside this contractual nexus.149  However, there may be much to be gained by looking further 
afield and, in particular, in the direction of what is sometimes called ‘direct producer liability’. There 
is a strong case to be made for direct producer liability, in particular for consumer buyers.  Producers 
may already be liable to consumers for defective products, on a number of bases (contractually liable 
 
145 Ibid. at para. 14.38. 
146 Ibid. at para. 14.40. 
147 Ibid. at para. 14.44. 
148 See further UK BIS Consultation Paper, Enhancing Consumer Confidence by Clarifying Consumer Law (2012). 
149 See also 1980 Act, s.14 on joint liability of finance houses. 
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under any guarantee pursuant to the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act, 1980; in negligence 
based on the principle in Donoghue v Stevenson; and strictly liable under the Liability for Defective 
Products Act 1991).  The introduction of direct liability for quality defects to consumers can be seen 
as a natural progression in the development of producer liability and hence it can be argued that it 
would not impose significant extra costs on producers who are well placed to re-distribute the cost 
through pricing or insurance.    Others have argued that the imposition of such liability might have a 
longer-term benefit of improving overall quality standards. Probably the strongest argument for 
imposing direct liability is that in many instances the producer will be the person responsible for the 
consumer’s complaint as where the defect originates in the manufacture or design.  Moreover, the 
consumer’s expectations concerning the goods (in relation to their description and purpose, for 
instance) may derive from advertising and promotional materials from the producer as much as sales-
talk from the supplier.  In certain circumstances, it may be easier to pursue a claim against the 
producer than against the seller.  In particular, this may be the case where the seller is insolvent or 
has merely gone out of business or is in some way inaccessible.  For example, in the context of distance 
selling, the producer may be more accessible to the consumer than the seller.  Seller’s liability is often 
justified on the basis that the seller is a conduit who can pass liability back to the producer through 
the distribution chain.  However, in reality, this may not be possible because the chain is broken 
through the use of exclusion clauses or insolvency.   
A number of European states already have some form of direct producer liability, including France, 
Portugal and Spain.150 In its 2006 Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis,151 the 
Commission asked whether direct producer liability for non-conformity should be introduced or not, 
at European level.  The Irish Government, in its response to the Green Paper, identified a number of 
areas where is would be unfair to impose direct producer liability, as, for example, where a seller 
claims that the product has certain characteristics which it does not.  On the other hand, it recognized 
that the supplier’s claims may be based on information from the producer in which case imposing 
liability on the supplier seems equally unfair.  Ultimately, the Irish Government failed to opt one way 
or the other stating that:  ‘[g]iven the uncertainties in this area it is not possible to conclude which 
option is preferable.’  Following consultation, the issue of direct producer liability has been suspended 
at European level.152 
 
150 See further M. Ebers, A. Jansson & O. Mayer ed., European Perspectives on Producers’ Liability, (Sellier 
European Law Publishers: Munich, 2009); H. Schulte-Nolke, et al, ed., EC Consumer Law Compendium: 
Comparative Analysis, (Sellier European Law Publishers: Munich, 2008) at 695-696. 
151  COM(2006) 744 final. 
152  COM (2007) 210 final, at 14.   
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The Sales Law Review Group also considered briefly the concept of direct producer liability, and, while 
noting that a case can be made in principle for its introduction, the Group was of the view that change 
of this kind would not be of significant benefit to consumers in practice and could well operate to their 
detriment.153 The Group noted that the current scheme of liability under the Sales of Goods Acts is 
clear, widely understood and accepted.  In contrast, a scheme for direct producer liability would be 
more complicated and consumers could face uncertainty and difficulty in establishing where liability 
lay in specific instances.  Undoubtedly, drafting the exact terms of such liability would not be without 
its challenges but such schemes already operate in a number of member states of the European Union, 
and so could be used as models.  Therefore, it is regrettable that this option for a new additional, 
alterative remedy for consumers was not explored in greater detail by the Group.  
Conclusion 
 
The above analysis seeks to capture the main recommendations for reform of the law of sale of goods 
and related transactions in Ireland out of a total of 124 recommendations in the final report of the 
Sales Law Review Group. By necessity, many more minor, and some not so minor, recommendations 
have not been mentioned.  For example, there are a number of proposals concerning auction sales154; 
the trigger for the passing of risk is to be delivery and not the passing of property155; the seller’s real 
remedies are to be rationalised156; and the Group recommends adoption of the Vienna Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980)157, to name a few.  Moreover, the Group 
envisaged that a separate Consumer Contract Rights Act should be enacted that would incorporate 
the main statutory provisions applicable to consumer contracts; whereas provisions relating to other 
non-core aspects of consumer contracts of sale should be dealt with, together with all of the provisions 
applicable to commercial contracts, in a new Sale of Goods and Related Transactions Act.158 This more 
formal separate of commercial and consumer law, as regards sale of goods and related transactions, 
would mark a significant step in the development of Irish consumer law as a doctrine driven by its own 
unique policy imperatives, such as the protection of the weaker party and the enhancement of 
 
153 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) para. 9.5. 
154 Ibid. at paras 3.47, 3.50, and 3.55. 
155 Ibid. at para. 6.56. 
156 Sales Law Review Group, Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (Dublin, 
Prn. A11/1576, 2011) paras 10.6, 10.22, and 10.32. 
157 Ibid. at para. 15.9. 
158 Ibid. at para. 14.14. 
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consumer confidence.159 At the same time, commercial sale of goods law would be freed to pursue its 
more traditional agenda whereby the legislation provides a framework to facilitate (not regulate) 
commercial transactions and to promote certainty.160      
 
As is evident from the above analysis, this new Sale of Goods Act will continue to have its feet firmly 
planted in the foundations of the 1893 Act, with reforms and refinements derived from a variety of 
sources including the extended family of the 1893 Act and the European Union.  It is notable that in 
completing its work, the Sales Law Review Group was greatly assisted by having access to numerous 
reports, consultation papers, and other such papers, on reform of the law of sale of goods from 
government departments and law reform bodies through-out the common law world. These reports 
made the process of law reform in Ireland more efficient and it is hoped more effective.  In turn, the 
final report of the Sale Law Review Group adds to this body of work and provides to others interested 
in reform of the law of sale of goods another perspective: an Irish perspective, which may be used as 
a template or model for others.     
 
Importantly, all these recommendations of the Sales Law Review Group have yet to be transformed 
into legislative action.  The Government has committed to introducing legislation to give effect to the 
Report.161  In reality, pressures on Attorney General’s Office and in Parliament to enact various 
measures as part of the EU/ IMF Programme for Financial Support for Ireland (the bail-out 
programme), means that reform of the law of sale of goods remains a low priority, in political terms.  
Ireland is already required under European law to transpose the recently agreed Consumer Rights 
Directive by 13 December 2013,162 and, it is envisaged that this will be achieved within the architecture 
of a statutory instrument.   Any further delay in implementation the Group’s recommendations for a 
new Sale of Goods Act and a consolidated Consumer Contract Rights Act may provide the Government 
with an opportunity to re-consider some aspects of the Report where, it is argued above, the Report 
did not go far enough, such as rules around digital content and remedies on contracts for the supply 
of services.   
 
159 Traditionally, consumer law was viewed by many as a specific application of general commercial law 
principles: see F.M.B. Reynolds ‘The Applicability of General Rules of Private Law to Consumer Disputes’, in 
Andermann et al ed., Law and the Weaker Party (Professional Books: Abingdon, 1982) Vol. 2, 93–110. Others 
have recognised a fundamental difference between commercial and consumer law and hence have called for 
separate legislation: e.g. M. Bridge, ‘What is to be Done about Sale of Goods?’, (2003) LQR 173; L. Sealy & R. 
Hooley, Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th edn (OUP: Oxford, 2009) at 16–17. 
160 See e.g. Lord Irvine, ‘The Law: An Engine for Trade,’ (2001) 64 MLR 333. 
161 See Press Release: ‘Bruton Announces Major Overhaul of Consumer Law’, 18 October 2011, at 
http://www.djei.ie/press/2011/20111018.htm. 
162 Directive 2011/83/EU, [2011]  OJ L 304/64, Art. 28. 
